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Contributions of anterior cingulate cortex and
basolateral amygdala to decision confidence
and learning under uncertainty
A. Stolyarova1,10, M. Rakhshan 2,10, E.E. Hart1, T.J. O’Dell3,4, M.A.K. Peters5,6,7, H. Lau 1,4,8,9,
A. Soltani 2,11* & A. Izquierdo 1,4,11*
The subjective sense of certainty, or confidence, in ambiguous sensory cues can alter the
interpretation of reward feedback and facilitate learning. We trained rats to report the
orientation of ambiguous visual stimuli according to a spatial stimulus-response rule that
must be learned. Following choice, rats could wait a self-timed delay for reward or initiate a
new trial. Waiting times increase with discrimination accuracy, demonstrating that this
measure can be used as a proxy for confidence. Chemogenetic silencing of BLA shortens
waiting times overall whereas ACC inhibition renders waiting times insensitive to confidence-
modulating attributes of visual stimuli, suggesting contribution of ACC but not BLA to
confidence computations. Subsequent reversal learning is enhanced by confidence. Both ACC
and BLA inhibition block this enhancement but via differential adjustments in learning stra-
tegies and consistent use of learned rules. Altogether, we demonstrate dissociable roles for
ACC and BLA in transmitting confidence and learning under uncertainty.
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Learning relies on the ability to use external cues to predictthe state of the world, take actions based on those predic-tions, and associate those actions with subsequent reward.
Learning such associations can be straightforward when stimuli
that precede actions or rewards can be discriminated clearly.
However, this is not the case in naturalistic settings in which
sensory cues or stimuli are ambiguous and thus the perception of
or prediction about the state of the world is uncertain. In such
situations, stimulus detection or discrimination are frequently
accompanied by a sense of certainty, or confidence, in choice1,2.
Recent evidence indicates that confidence may influence neural
activity in brain regions involved in orchestrating reward
responses3,4 particularly when reward is significantly delayed5.
Consequently, the sensory properties of reward-predicting cues
and confidence in disambiguating them may directly influence
valuation6 and learning from reward feedback.
Recent studies in humans have revealed neural correlates of
confidence estimation and learning in several brain regions,
including the prefrontal cortex7,8. However, it is unclear whether
these areas are causally involved in these processes. Despite powerful
interference techniques in rodents9, most rodents studies on neural
mechanisms of confidence have been conducted within olfactory
and auditory modalities10,11. In contrast, human studies on choice
and learning under perceptual uncertainty have focused on visual
processing, making it difficult to link findings across species.
Here, we trained rats to report the orientation of noisy Gabor
patches by making spatial choices based on a learned
stimulus–response rule (e.g., horizontal→ left and vertical→
right). We manipulated different aspects of the visual stimuli to
alter performance and uncertainty associated with discriminating
the orientation. Following action selection using a touchscreen,
rats expressed their confidence by time-wagering: they could wait
for a variable amount of time before they could receive a possible
reward or initiate a new trial11. This design allowed us to measure
confidence on a trial-by-trial basis. After ensuring that rats
learned the stimulus–response associations, we reversed these
associations to study the effect of confidence on learning.
Extensive studies in rodents have shown a distributed network
supports learning and choice involving uncertain outcomes,
including basolateral amygdala (BLA)12–14 and anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC)15,16. Here, we use inhibitory designer receptors
exclusively activated by designer drugs (DREADDs) to transiently
inactivate projection neurons in the ACC or BLA in order to test
the causal role of each area in confidence estimation or compu-
tation, and in learning under perceptual uncertainty.
We observe that rats are willing to tolerate longer delays to
receive reward outcomes after faster and easier perceptual decisions
involving more informative stimuli. Importantly, ACC is required
for appropriate waiting according to the uncertainty of the visual
stimulus and ensuing choice. Following ACC inhibition, post-
decision waiting times are less sensitive to the strength of the visual
evidence, and accuracy tracks the waiting times on a trial-by-trial
basis less closely. In contrast, inhibition of BLA decreases rats’
willingness to wait overall, regardless of the strength of the visual
information and decision difficulty. Subsequent reversal learning is
enhanced by confidence and both ACC and BLA inhibition block
this enhancement. However, these effects happen through differ-
ential adjustments in response to reward feedback and in consistent
use of learned rules on successive trials. Together, our results
demonstrate dissociable contributions of ACC and BLA to com-
putations of confidence and learning under uncertainty.
Results
Waiting time provides a proxy for confidence. To assess con-
fidence during perceptual choice with uncertain visual
information, we used a novel experimental paradigm in which
rats were first presented with a single Gabor patch with one of
two possible dominant orientations (horizontal (H) and vertical
(V)) embedded in noise (Fig. 1a, b). Perceptual uncertainty was
manipulated using two parameters of the visual stimuli: (1) the
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), defined as the ratio of the contrast of
the Gabor patch relative to the contrast of the added Gaussian
noise; and (2) the overall contrast of both the Gabor patch and
the added noise for a given SNR. These manipulations allowed us
to modulate performance and confidence independently in order
to design matched-performance different-confidence stimulus
pairs used for learning17–19. Following stimulus presentation, rats
reported the perceived orientation by nosepoking one of the two
side compartments of the touchscreen based on a complementary
stimulus–response rule (e.g., H→ left and V→ right). Following
action selection, rats expressed confidence in their response via
time wagering; that is, they could wait for a probabilistically
delivered reward if confident or initiate a new trial otherwise (see
Methods).
We found that during sessions with vehicle administration (see
Viral constructs in Methods), our main control condition, waiting
time and discrimination performance (the signal detection theoretic
metric d′, a reliable measure of perceptual discrimination capacity;
see Methods) were modulated by both the SNR and contrast of
visual stimuli (Supplementary Fig. 1). More specifically, waiting
time monotonically increased with SNR for any value of contrast
(GLM contrast= 40: p= 1.5 × 10−57; βSNR= 1.13, p= 0.0002;
GLMcontrast= 60: p= 8.7 × 10−102; βSNR= 2.37, p= 7.7 × 10−11;
GLMcontrast= 80: p= 7.3 × 10−132; βSNR= 2.52, p= 2.7 × 10−10)
but this effect was modulated by overall stimulus contrast (GLM:
p= 1 × 10−130; βSNR×contrast= 0.03, p= 0.0008). All our results
hold when we perform our analyses for each contrast level
separately (Supplementary Figs. 2 and 3).
Averaging over different contrast levels, we found that the
probability of making a correct response was larger on average
when SNR was larger (GLM: p= 1.1 × 10−51; βSNR= 0.054, p=
1.3 × 10−29; p(correct)= 0.69 ± 0.06, 0.74 ± 0.05, and 0.80 ± 0.04
for SNR of 2–4, respectively; where the value after ± denotes the
standard deviation), and this also was true when considering
individual contrast values separately (see Supplementary Note 1
and Supplementary Fig. 4). In addition, the number of re-
initiations decreased as SNR increased (GLM: p= 7.6 × 10−11;
βSNR=−0.01, p= 4.36 × 10−6; fraction of re-initiated trials=
0.17 ± 0.02, 0.16 ± 0.03, and 0.15 ± 0.02 for SNR of 2–4,
respectively; Supplementary Note 2). Finally, the distribution of
waiting time generally followed that of reward delivery (Supple-
mentary Fig. 5). It is likely, however, that rats wait for a minimum
amount of time (i.e., a threshold) before giving up or waiting
longer. The distribution is skewed given the proximity of
expected reward; possibly a temporal distortion as commonly
reported in the interval timing literature20 near the median time
of reward dispensation, as shown in Supplementary Fig. 5. When
we include all rats in our analysis, it appears most rats are waiting
past this threshold (i.e., being more patient) as a common strategy
(Supplementary Fig. 5b). Overall, these results illustrate that rats
learned the task and used visual stimuli to make a choice and for
post-choice wagering.
To show that waiting time to reinitiate a trial met several of the
criteria for confidence readout, we analyzed this measure along
with reaction time to make a response (i.e., the time between
stimulus onset and nosepoke) during the control sessions. We
found that waiting times were longer on trials with a larger SNR
(GLM: p= 2.5 × 10−188; βSNR= 1.91, p= 1.2 × 10−16; Fig. 2a).
This effect has previously been reported for confidence reports
in human and nonhuman primates8,18,21, but not in rodents.
In contrast, reaction time decreased with increased SNR (GLM:
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p= 3.04 × 10−216; βSNR=−0.32, p= 1.27 × 10−78; Fig. 2b). In
addition, waiting times were negatively correlated with reaction
times on a trial-by-trial basis (GLM: p= 4.98 × 10−61; βRT=−7,
p= 4.97 × 10−61; Fig. 2c). Crucially, this negative correlation was
significant for both correct and incorrect responses (GLM Correct:
βRT=−8.66, p= 3.62× 10−51; GLM Incorrect: βRT=−4.16, p=
2.15 × 10−25; Supplementary Fig. 6a, b). However, the correlation
between waiting time and reaction time is associated more
negatively for correct trials relative to incorrect trials (mean(diff)
=−0.074 s; paired-sample t test; t(146)=−4.53, p= 1.2 × 10−5;
Supplementary Fig. 6c). A negative correlation between con-
fidence and reaction time involving visual stimuli has also been
reported in primates, but not in rodents22–24.
To examine the relationship between accuracy and time
wagering, we computed waiting time separately for correct and
incorrect responses. We found that rats waited significantly longer
following correct relative to incorrect responses, or trial type (diff
(mean)= 4.74 s; GLM: p= 1.31 × 10−66; βtrial type= 4.57, p=
2.46 × 10−33; Fig. 2d). Consistent with this result, on trials with a
re-initiation, rats discriminated more accurately when waiting
times were longer for a given SNR (Pearson correlation; SNR= 2:
r= 0.017, p= 0.83; SNR= 3, r= 0.19, p= 0.017; SNR= 4, r=
0.19, p= 0.02; Fig. 2a). In addition, waiting times on both correct
and incorrect responses increased with larger SNR (GLM: Correct;
p= 1.95 × 10−78; βSNR= 3.74, p= 1.40 × 10−41; incorrect; p=
1.77 × 10−36; βSNR= 1.91, p= 2.33 × 10−19). Finally, the normal-
ized difference in waiting times between correct and incorrect
responses changed strongly (30–50%) for different SNR values
(Fig. 2d inset). These results demonstrate that not only is waiting
time sensitive to the strength of the visual information, but it also
reflects rats’ accuracy in discrimination.
Compatible with previous findings25–27, we also found that
reaction times decreased as SNR increased and were faster for
correct responses relative to incorrect responses/discrimination
(GLM: p= 0.05; βSNR=−0.069, p= 0.03; Fig. 2e). The normal-
ized difference in reaction times between correct and incorrect
responses, however, changed only between 1 and 5% for different
SNR values compared to 30–50% for waiting times (Fig. 2e inset).
In addition, unlike waiting time, there was no significant
correlation between performance and reaction time on a
session-by-session basis (Pearson correlation; SNR= 2, r=
−0.1, p= 0.2; SNR= 3, r= 0.13, p= 0.1; SNR= 4, r= 0.01,
p= 0.82; Fig. 2b). Importantly, we found similar results when we
performed all above analyses for each value of contrast separately
(Supplementary Fig. 2). Moreover, independently of SNR and
contrast levels, waiting time increased with discrimination
performance (Supplementary Fig. 1b). Finally, all these results
hold when we used normalized waiting time and reaction time
(see Supplementary Note 3).
Together, our results illustrate that waiting time reflects
confidence in a perceptual discrimination with much higher
fidelity than that of reaction time, to include the proportional
nature of confidence and accuracy. Our findings thus extend
previous observations in primates28 to rodents, and suggest that
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Fig. 1 Schematic of the experimental paradigm, visual stimuli, and stimulus–response rule. a Timeline of each trial in the learning under perceptual
uncertainty task. The rat first initiated a trial by nosepoking a white square in the center of the screen. The initiation stimulus then disappeared, and the rat
was briefly presented (1 s) with a single horizontal (H) or vertical (V) Gabor patch masked by noise. Rats were required to report the dominant orientation
(H or V) via nosepoke based on a complementary stimulus–response rule; e.g., H→ left and V→ right. Correct choices were rewarded probabilistically (on
70% of randomly selected trials), following variable delay times. After stimulus discrimination, rats could wait a self-timed delay in anticipation of reward
or initiate a new trial. The initiation stimulus appeared on the touchscreen 2 s after a rat indicated its choice. b Examples of visual stimuli and one of the two
stimulus–response rules. We refer to their discriminability as an SNR value reflecting the strength of visual signal (4, most discriminable; 3, moderately
discriminable; 2, least discriminable). After discrimination of the visual stimulus, the rat makes a response (using the touchscreen) according to the rule
H→ Left and V→ right
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waiting time in our paradigm can also serve as a proxy for
decision confidence11.
Dissociable contributions of BLA and ACC to time wagering.
We expressed Gi-coupled DREADDs on projection neurons of
ACC and BLA (Fig. 3). After allowing time for transduction, we
injected rats with clozapine-N-oxide (CNO) prior to a subset of
testing sessions to inhibit these brain regions, using a within-subject
design. In addition, to confirm the effect of CNO using ex vivo
electrophysiological recording, we prepared a separate group of rats
(n= 3) with ACC DREADDs using identical procedures. We found
a significant reduction in field potential after CNO application only
in the transfected slices (Supplementary Fig. 7).
For rats performing the main experiments, we observed a
significant interaction of drug condition (vehicle and CNO),
targeted brain region (BLA or ACC), and SNR on waiting
time when combining correct and incorrect responses (GLM: p=
10−17; βdrug×region×ratio= 1.84, p= 7.4 × 10−6). We found no
significant effect of the targeted brain region (BLA vs. ACC) in
sessions following vehicle administration on waiting time (GLM:
p= 2.5 × 10−188; βregion=−0.93, p= 0.335). In contrast, follow-
ing CNO administration, we observed a significant effect of the
targeted brain region on waiting time (GLM: p= 6.36 × 10−305;
βregion= 1.66, p= 5.11 × 10−55; Fig. 4a, b).
An analysis of waiting time for different SNR values averaged
across all trial types (correct and incorrect) revealed a significant
drug × SNR × brain region interaction (GLM: p= 7.07 × 10−282;
βdrug×SNR×region= 1.66, p= 1.94 × 10−5). When the trial type
(correct vs. incorrect) was included as a within-subject factor,
there was similarly a significant trial type × drug × brain region
interaction (GLM: p= 10−17, βtrialtype×drug×region= 1.84, p=
7.40 × 10−6). These results show that inhibition of ACC or BLA
affect rats’ willingness to wait depending on SNR (perceptual
uncertainty) as well as based on whether their response was
correct or incorrect.
Given these interaction effects, we then measured the influence of
inhibition of ACC and BLA on waiting time separately for each
value of SNR. We found that overall, inhibition of ACC significantly
increased waiting time compared to vehicle (diff(mean)= 3.45 s;
GLM: p= 4.98 × 10−43; βdrug= 3.45, p= 4.98 × 10−43; Fig. 4a, c).
In contrast, inhibition of BLA significantly reduced rats’ overall
willingness to wait before reinitiation of a new trial (diff(mean)=
−4.59 s; GLM: p= 4.87 × 10−76; βdrug=−4.58, p= 4.86 × 10−76;
Fig. 4b, c). Importantly, we found a significant interaction of SNR
by drug condition (CNO vs. vehicle administration) for ACC
(GLM: βSNR×drug=−2.19, p= 1.78 × 10−10), indicating that the
observed increase in waiting time due to ACC inhibition
depended on SNR. In contrast, the decrease in waiting time due
to BLA inhibition was not SNR-specific (GLM: βSNR×drug=
−0.3434, p= 0.16), indicating that BLA inhibition increased
sensitivity to delays (or equivalently increased impulsivity), as has
been reported before29. Finally, we found similar results when we
performed our analyses for each value of contrast separately
(Supplementary Fig. 3a–c).
Despite strong, dissociable effects on waiting time, inhibition of
ACC and BLA did not change the overall task performance,
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Fig. 2 Waiting time serves as a proxy for confidence that is more sensitive than reaction time. a Waiting time before reinitiation increases as SNR
increases. Plotted are the distributions of waiting times for each SNR for all sessions, and probability correct (P(c)) as a second axis: 2 (blue), 3 (cyan), and
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and all rats. Each data point is a trial in a session following vehicle administration. d Waiting time is larger for correct compared to incorrect responses for
any SNR. Plotted is waiting time for all trials (black), correct trials (green), and incorrect trials (purple) for different SNR. The inset shows the relative
difference in waiting time between correct and incorrect responses for different SNR. Error bars show the S.E.M. over sessions (typically smaller than the
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discrimination accuracy, response bias, or reaction time. First,
probability of correct response was not significantly different
between vehicle and CNO administration (GLM: p = 0.04; βdrug =
0.003, p = 0.57; Fig. 5a). Second, we computed discrimination
performance, or d′, and found this measure was also not
significantly different between vehicle and CNO administration
(GLM: p = 4.19 × 10−24; βdrug = −0.26, p = 0.21; Fig. 5b).
Importantly, we observed a strong and significant correlation
between discrimination accuracy d′ following CNO administra-
tion and following vehicle administration in rats with DREADDs
expressed either in ACC (Pearson correlation; r = 0.847, p =
1.25 × 10−6) or BLA (Pearson correlation; r = 0.767, p = 1.21 ×
10−5). Moreover, contrary to the significant effect of SNR on
discrimination accuracy d′ (GLM: p = 4.19 × 10−24; βratio = 0.38,
p = 2.38 × 10−11), we found no significant main effect or
interaction of drug condition (CNO vs. vehicle administration)
and targeted brain region (ACC vs. BLA) on d′ (GLM: βdrug =
−0.26, p = 0.21; βregion = 0.04, p = 0.84), indicating that
perceptual discrimination was not affected by ACC or BLA
inhibition. Third, we found no significant effect of drug condition
(CNO vs. vehicle) and targeted brain region on the decision
criterion (i.e., the response bias30; GLM: p = 0.19; βdrug = −0.03,
p = 0.23; βregion = −0.007, p = 0.74). Finally, ACC and BLA
inhibition failed to affect task engagement and perceptual
processing speed as evidenced by the lack of change in the
distributions of reaction time (GLM: p = 10−16; βdrug = −0.01,
p = 0.81; βregion = 0.001, p = 0.98; Fig. 4f), and these responses
also did not differ by trial type (correct vs. incorrect; Correct:
GLM: p = 2.01 × 10−208; βratio = −0.33, p = 1.01 × 10−81;
Incorrect: GLM: p = 3.44 × 10−196; βratio = −0.32, p = 3.14 ×
10−72; Fig. 4g, h). This pattern also held for each value of contrast
separately (Supplementary Fig. 3d–f). Together these findings
demonstrate that the observed effects of ACC and BLA inhibition
on waiting times were not attributable to changes in decision-
making processes related to visual discrimination.
Finally, in additional control conditions, we also tested whether
the presence of active virus was essential for the observed
changes, and whether vehicle administration alone could cause
changes in behavior. To do so, we measured behavioral responses
in the rats with expressed DREADDs but without the adminis-
tration of vehicle (no-injection control prior to reversal) and in
rats with null virus and compared them with those under vehicle
administration (i.e., the main control condition). We found that
waiting time and reaction time did not differ between vehicle
administration and no-injection control (Supplementary Note 4
and Supplementary Fig. 8). In addition, we found that the
observed effects of CNO depended on the presence of active virus
(Supplementary Note 5 and Supplementary Fig. 9).
Together, these results suggest that ACC contributes to the
computations and transmission of confidence to influence post-
decision behavior. In contrast, BLA mainly increases waiting time
independently of perceptual uncertainty perhaps by controlling
impulsive behavior during choice under uncertainty.
ACC-specific role in evaluation for confidence report. Although
BLA inhibition decreased waiting time, this measure still increased
with greater SNR (GLM: p = 2.32 × 10−113; βSNR = 1.59, p = 5.44
× 10−23; Fig. 4c) similar to the behavioral pattern observed under
vehicle administration (GLM: p = 1.63 × 10−189; βSNR = 1.92, p =
3.16 × 10−32). This suggests that BLA contributes to shifting the
influence of confidence on post-decision processes making the
animal more patient irrespective of their confidence. In contrast,
ACC inhibition rendered waiting time mainly insensitive to SNR
(GLM: p = 7.17 × 10−30; βSNR = −0.27, p = 0.22; Fig. 4c), with a
significant effect of SNR on correct trials (GLM: p = 6.09 × 10−7;
βratio = 1.22, p = 6.09 × 10−7; Fig. 4d), but not for incorrect trials
(GLM: p = 0.2; βratio = −0.27, p = 0.2; Fig. 4e). Critically, ACC
inhibition did not cause a uniform increase in waiting time for all
SNR; the z-scored waiting time for SNR= 4 in ACC inhibition is
even decreased compared to vehicle (two-sided t test: t(213) =
12.41, p = 5.4 × 10−27). This suggests that ACC inhibition
removes the sensitivity to SNR and does not simply increase
waiting time. In addition, the distributions of waiting times were
quite symmetric in all conditions, and their means and medians
were very far from the 40 s maximum waiting time (Supple-
mentary Fig. 5). This provides evidence that the observed
insensitivity of waiting time to SNR after ACC inhibition was
unlikely due to a ceiling effect. Interestingly, ACC inhibition
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strength of sensory signal, whereas BLA inhibition shift waiting times. Plotted is the waiting time for all trials as a function of SNR following vehicle
administration (yellow), inhibition of BLA (orange), and inhibition of ACC (blue). d, e Same as in panel (c) but only on trials in which a correct (d) or
incorrect (e) response was made. Error bars show the S.E.M. over sessions (typically smaller than the symbols). f Reaction time is unaffected by inhibition
of either ACC or BLA. Plotted is the reaction time for all trials as a function of SNR following vehicle administration (yellow), inhibition of BLA (orange), and
inhibition of ACC (blue). g, h Same as in panel (f) but only on trials in which a correct (g) or incorrect (h) response was made. Source data are provided as
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renders waiting time even insensitive to the contrast level of
visual stimuli such that for higher contrast and higher SNR,
waiting time following inhibition dropped below the control
condition (Supplementary Fig. 3c). These findings demon-
strate that ACC is involved in modifying visual uncertainty,
perhaps via gain modulation, in order to compute perceptual
uncertainty and to influence post-decision processes based on the
latter.
To further test this, we computed metacognitive efficiency
(meta—d′/d′), that assesses how well waiting time tracks
discrimination performance (d′) across trials31, or equivalently,
the trial-by-trial correspondence of accuracy and waiting time
(see Methods). A one-way ANOVA resulted in a significant
difference between groups (one-way ANOVA: F(2,267) = 12.65,
p = 5.6142 × 10−6). Following BLA inhibition, meta—d′/d′ was
not significantly different from vehicle (one-way ANOVA: diff
(mean)= 0.0509, p = 0.4430). However, following ACC inhibi-
tion, meta—d′/d′, was significantly lower than vehicle (one-way
ANOVA: diff(mean)=−0.2366, p = 1.6438 × 10−6; Fig. 5c).
These results demonstrate that confidence report following ACC
inhibition becomes less sensitive to the accuracy of the trial and
thus further suggest that ACC is involved in the computation of
confidence. Consistent with these results, we found that the trial-
by-trial correlation between waiting time and reaction time was
weaker following ACC inhibition compared to BLA inhibition
(Supplementary Fig. 10 and Supplementary Note 6).
Collectively, these results suggest that whereas inhibition of
BLA decreases waiting time, this effect is most likely due to a
general delay aversion or an increase in impulsive choice, because
rats are still able to appropriately scale their waiting times
according to performance and trial difficulty. In contrast,
inhibition of the ACC renders rats’ waiting times relatively
insensitive to discrimination accuracy (d′) and SNR, suggesting
that this region meaningfully participates in estimating the
reliability of visual stimuli and consequently, computing and
reporting confidence. Taken together with the results we provide
in the previous section, we show that here in rats we are able to
interfere with and dissociate first order (discrimination perfor-
mance) from second order (metacognition) processes, as has been
done in nonhuman and human primates18,19,32,33.
Confidence enhances reversal learning. For the reversal learning
phase, we found two pairs of SNR and contrast level in which a
given rat demonstrated equivalent accuracy (i.e., matched dis-
crimination accuracy, or d′). Critically, although performance was
equivalent for these two pairs, the rat on average waited longer for
one of the pairs. We then randomly chose one of these pairs for
each rat for the reversal learning phase. If the rat waited on
average less time for one pair over the other, this was designated
the low-confidence (LC) condition. If the rat waited on average
more time than the other, this was designated the high-
confidence (HC) condition. We also confirmed that rats in the
HC and LC conditions received the same amount of reward in the
session prior to reversal. During reversal learning, the stimulus
that signaled the possibility for a trial reinitiation (i.e., a white
square in the middle panel) was removed. This change was
introduced to ensure that the feedback rats received in the
reversal learning phase was not a function of waiting time but
rather a function of accuracy in learning the reversal policy.
Correct responses, now under a reversed stimulus–response rule,
were reinforced probabilistically as before (70% of the time). We
calculated d′ and confidence using only the data from sessions
that were not preceded by injections (i.e., no-injection
control prior to reversal) in order to assign rats to HC and LC
conditions.
We performed several analyses to ensure that the only
difference between HC and LC conditions was the confidence
reported via waiting time. First, we found that d′ for HC and LC
conditions were not significantly different for each of the stimuli
that was administered after reversal, i.e., the contrast-SNR pairs
that were chosen for reversal were not associated with different d′
before reversal (Stepwise GLM: p = 0.11; βconfidence = 0.43, p =
0.32; Supplementary Fig. 11a). Second, d′ for HC and LC
conditions were not significantly different across all contrast-SNR
pairs (GLM: p = 8.2 × 10−16; βconfidence = −0.14, p = 0.92;
Supplementary Fig. 11b). Third, metacognitive efficiency (meta—
d′/d′) across HC and LC conditions was not significantly different
for the specific contrast-SNR pair that was used after reversal
(Stepwise GLM: p = 0.44; βconfidence = −0.1, p = 0.44;
Supplementary Fig. 11c). Fourth, rats in both HC and LC
conditions acquired equal amount of reward in the no-injection
control session for the specific pair of contrast and SNR values
(Stepwise GLM: p = 0.01; βconfidence = −0.2, p = 0.08;
Supplementary Fig. 11d). Finally, we found that HC and LC
conditions were different in waiting time, reflecting confidence,
for the specific contrast-SNR pair that was used after reversal
(Stepwise GLM: p = 2.7 × 10−31; βconfidence = −28.3, p = 2.81 ×
10−9; Supplementary Fig. 11e). Together, these results illustrate
that the only difference between HC and LC conditions was the
confidence.
To assess the effect of perceptual uncertainty on learning, we
analyzed the probability of correct response for both HC and LC
conditions for rats receiving vehicle or CNO injections, and for
ACC or BLA as the targeted brain region. We observed significant
interactions of drug by confidence level (GLM: p = 2.95 × 1082;
βdrug×confidence = −0.22, p = 3.71 × 10−7 as well as drug by trial
bin (β = −0.009, p = 0.0001). There was also a significant main
effect of trial bin (β = 0.036, p = 1.13 × 10−44), illustrating that
all rats were able to learn the new stimulus–response rule.
Similarly, there was a significant main effect of confidence on
learning (β = 0.15, p = 3.4 × 10−6).
To identify how learning and choice strategies were affected by
confidence, we first compared learning between HC and LC
conditions following vehicle administration. We found that rats
in the HC condition performed better than the rats in the LC
condition following vehicle administration (diff(mean)= 0.1063;
GLM: p = 1.13 × 10−39; confidence: β = 0.151, p = 2.71 × 10−6).
This improvement in performance was due to faster learning in
the HC compared to LC condition (chi-square test of ratio; p =
5.87 × 10−26; Fig. 6a inset) and the steady state of performance
was not affected by confidence (chi-square test of ratio; p = 0.27).
The observed faster learning occurred simultaneously with an
increase in selection of the correct stimulus–response rule
following selection of this rule and being rewarded on the
preceding trial (Win–Stay; Permutation test; p = 9.7 × 10−10;
Fig. 6b). In addition, animals increased their tendency to switch
from the incorrect to correct stimulus–response rule following
unrewarded trials when the response on the preceding trial was
incorrect (Lose–Switch after incorrect; Permutation test; p =
0.046). The improvement in learning due to higher confidence
was also accompanied by a decrease in switch from the correct to
incorrect stimulus–response rule when the response on the
preceding trial was correct but not rewarded (Lose–Switch after
correct; note that 30% of correct responses were not rewarded by
design; Permutation test; p = 3.3 × 10−4). We also compared the
tendency of the animals to repeat the same stimulus–response
rule as in the previous trial beyond what is expected by chance,
measured by the rule-based repetition index (RRI34; see
Methods). We found that RRI was larger for the HC relative to
LC condition (Permutation test; p = 0.029), indicating that
animals were more consistent/persistent in their behavior
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(following a specific rule) under higher confidence. Together,
these results suggest that confidence can improve learning
strategies from all possible outcomes and moreover, can increase
consistency in following learned stimulus–response rules. To our
knowledge, the observed enhancing effect of perceptual con-
fidence on learning has been reported in humans3 but not in
rodents, and the effects on rule consistency are novel.
Both BLA and ACC support reversal learning. We next com-
pared overall learning across different DREADDS inhibition con-
ditions. In contrast to the control conditions, the overall
performance over time in the LC condition was significantly better
than in the HC condition following CNO treatment (diff(mean)=
0.0456; GLM: p = 5.62 × 10−46; βconfidence = −0.0719, p = 0.01).
Furthermore, the reduction in performance was not significantly
different between ACC and BLA as the targeted region (GLM:
p = 5.78 × 10−42; βregion = −0.035, p = 0.396; Fig. 7a, c). To
estimate the rate of learning, we fit rats’ learning curves after the
reversal using an exponential function (see Methods for details).
We observed that the exponent or the learning parameter (ɑ;
which reflects the rate of learning) was significantly different
between CNO and vehicle administration sessions in the HC
condition (confidence interval; ACC; CNO, [15.2,15.78], vehicle,
[9.42,10.04]; BLA; CNO, [13.28,16.20], vehicle, [8.23,9.23]).
However, there was no significant difference in the learning
parameter between sessions following CNO and vehicle admin-
istration in the LC condition (confidence interval; ACC; CNO,
[12.52,13.75], vehicle, [12.36,15.18]; BLA; CNO, [12.78,14.12],
vehicle, [12.63,14.33]). Therefore, following inhibition of either
ACC or BLA, the rate of learning decreased in the HC but not the
LC condition. Together, these results indicate that whereas rats
could still learn a new stimulus–response rule after the inhibition
of the ACC or BLA, these brain regions contribute to an
enhancing effect (i.e., the use) of perceptual confidence on
learning despite matched d′ across HC and LC conditions.
BLA and ACC use confidence for learning strategy. Results
reported above suggest that both types of DREADDs inhibition
(in ACC or BLA) removed the benefit of confidence on learning.
To better reveal similarities and differences between the effects of
ACC and BLA inhibition on learning and their dependence on
confidence, we computed changes in the learning strategies and
consistency in following stimulus–response rules after ACC and
BLA inhibition, separately for rats in the LC and HC conditions.
First, we examined the effect of positive feedback on the
tendency to stay on the correct stimulus–response rule
(Win–Stay). We found that inhibition of either ACC or BLA
resulted in a reduction in the difference in Win–Stay between HC
and LC conditions (Permutation test; ACC: p = 5.43 × 10−4;
BLA: p = 5.83 × 10−12; Fig. 7b, d) but this reduction was stronger
for BLA inhibition (Permutation test; p = 0.0048). This suggests
that both ACC and BLA inhibition attenuate reversal learning by
reducing the tendency to repeat a rewarded stimulus–response
rule due to higher confidence. Therefore, although both ACC and
BLA contribute to mediating the effect of confidence on learning
from positive feedback, the stronger attenuation and reversal of
this effect following BLA inhibition illustrates a more prominent
role for BLA in learning under uncertainty.
Secondly, we analyzed the effect of negative feedback on
switching from the previous stimulus–response rule, separately
for when the previous rule was correct (Lose–Switch after correct)
and when the previous rule was incorrect (Lose–Switch after
incorrect). We examined these two types of trials separately
because as we showed above, confidence has differential effects on
these trials (Fig. 6b). We observed that both ACC and BLA
inhibition reversed the effect of confidence (i.e., difference
between HC and LC conditions) on learning from negative
feedback; however, this was only significant for BLA (Permuta-
tion test; ACC Lose–Switch after correct: p = 0.23; ACC
Lose–Switch after incorrect: p = 0.44; BLA Lose–Switch after
correct: p = 7.4 × 10−4; BLA Lose–Switch after incorrect: p =
0.0044; Fig. 7b, d). In addition, the effect of confidence on
Lose–Switch after an incorrect response became more negative
after ACC inhibition compared to BLA inhibition (Permutation
test; p = 0.0051), indicating a stronger role for ACC in learning
from negative feedback when the response was incorrect.
Together, these results suggest that BLA has a more pronounced
role in mediating the effect of confidence in learning from
positive feedback whereas ACC is more involved in mediating the
effect of confidence in learning from negative feedback.
Finally, we evaluated the consistency in using learned
stimulus–response rules using the RRI. We found that BLA but
not ACC inhibition reversed the effect of confidence on RRI
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(Permutation test; ACC: p = 0.36; BLA: p = 4.6 × 10−4; Fig. 7b,
d), and this effect was more negative after BLA than ACC
inhibition (Permutation test; p = 4.4 × 10−4). This indicates that
BLA, but not ACC, is important for mediating the effect of
confidence in consistently using learned stimulus–response rules
under perceptual uncertainty. Importantly, there was no
significant difference between the effects of confidence on all
aforementioned strategies in sessions following vehicle adminis-
tration based on the targeted region (Permutation test; Win–Stay:
p = 0.31; Lose–Switch after correct: p = 0.10; Lose–Switch after
incorrect: p = 0.35; RI: p = 0.36; Fig. 7b, d).
Together, these results reveal dissociable effects of ACC and
BLA inhibition on learning under uncertainty. Importantly, only
BLA inhibition consistently reversed the benefit of confidence on
learning from both positive and negative feedback. This suggests
that BLA is directly involved in confidence-dependent learning
(and not estimation) because BLA inhibition globally shifts
confidence readout, as shown earlier. Different from BLA effects,
ACC has a more specific role in supporting learning, mainly from
positive feedback (Win–Stay), following a correct response and to
lesser extent from negative feedback perhaps by making
confidence computation sensitive to the level of perceptual
uncertainty, as suggested by our results on confidence readout. In
addition, the consistency in using learned stimulus–response
rules did not differ by confidence condition following ACC
inhibition, whereas BLA inhibition made rats less likely to apply
the learned rules under higher confidence.
Discussion
We examined the causal roles of ACC and BLA in confidence
report and learning under perceptual uncertainty. We trained rats
to report the orientation of ambiguous visual stimuli based on a
learned stimulus–response rule and we read out their confidence
in choice using a time wagering task. Despite previous suggestions
for possible roles of confidence in learning3,28, such roles had not
been explored directly in any animal model. We found that high
confidence in a perceptual decision can boost subsequent reversal
learning of stimulus–response rules using reward feedback, even
when we controlled for signal processing capacity (i.e., task per-
formance). Critically, all rats were able to learn new reward
contingencies upon the change in stimulus–response mapping,
but the learning was faster in the group of rats that exhibited
higher confidence at the onset of reversal. We found that the BLA
and ACC are both required for the enhancement of learning by
perceptual certainty or confidence.
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Several studies find that confidence increases as stimulus
strength increases for correct trials but decreases as stimulus
strength increases for error trials. This opposing relation on
correct and error trials has been deemed a statistical signature
(also referred to as divergence signature) of confidence report35.
We did not observe this pattern in our data and instead found
that waiting time (as a proxy for confidence) increased as sti-
mulus strength (i.e., SNR) increased for both correct and error
trials. However, there are recent experimental and theoretical
studies showing that confidence can also increase on error trials
with larger sensory evidence and thus, suggest that the oppos-
ing pattern on correct and error is not necessarily the defining
signature of confidence as previously assumed23,32,36,37. More
specifically, there are recent studies based on Bayesian frame-
work that argue this divergence signature of confidence dis-
appears under different conditions of stimuli, noise, and task
structure38,39. Relevant to the present results, a study that
similarly observed a violation of this divergence featured a
stimulus composed of a feature that was used to probe accuracy
and an orthogonal manipulation of stimulus strength32,39. In
fact, this is the case in our experiment in which we assessed
accuracy in perceptual judgment by changing SNR and contrast
of the stimuli as two orthogonal manipulations. In addition,
bounded accumulation models have been used to explain how
the time to decision influences confidence and why confidence
in error trials increases with stronger stimulus strength37,38.
Taken together, observing a violation of this divergence in our
experiment is a feasible outcome based on the aforementioned
studies.
In rats, perceptual metacognition has been previously assessed
within olfactory and auditory2,10,11 but not visual modalities. These
studies have revealed a role of orbitofrontal cortex (OFC); for
example, it has been shown that activity in the rat OFC reflects the
degree of uncertainty in decisions based on olfactory information
during reward anticipation2. Similar to our results for the ACC,
inhibition of OFC impairs behavioral adjustments to decision
confidence, but not decision accuracy11. However, there are several
important differences, not just similarities, between previous and
present studies. For example, Lak et al.11 showed an opposing
pattern for waiting time on correct and incorrect trials described
above11, whereas we found that waiting time increased for both
correct and incorrect trials, across all contrast levels, and this
relationship depended on the ACC. Our pattern of results also
differed from that of Lak et al.11 wherein they showed reduced
waiting time on the most certain trials (greatest SNR value)11. Yet
both our present findings and those of Lak et al. could be inter-
preted as a reduced variance in waiting time that indicates rats may
be using an average (15 s wait time average, in the case of our
experiment) in lieu of sensory evidence11. Importantly, unlike
waiting times, reaction times did not exhibit this pattern, suggesting
that it is not simply a motor timing effect, but instead a true effect
on confidence readout.
It is also unlikely that ACC inactivation makes rats generally
more patient, or willing-to-wait overall. Indeed, we did not
observe a uniform increase in waiting times across all SNR values.
It has been shown that ACC inhibition actually increases
impulsivity40, which makes this explanation unlikely for the
present pattern of results. Nevertheless, here, we show that the
ACC plays a similar role to the OFC but in visual information
processing. That is, the ACC may guide commitment to and
persistence with the current behavior based on the quality of
visual evidence that led to the decision. These similarities offer
interesting possibilities for the frontocortical mechanisms of
confidence estimation, and suggest there may not be a sub-
regional specialization for this process41,42. Consequently, future
research using temporally-precise, causal manipulations are
needed to determine differential roles of ACC and OFC in
decision confidence and learning under uncertainty.
We show here that unlike BLA inhibition, ACC inhibition
renders confidence readout rather insensitive to both attributes of
visual stimuli (SNR and contrast), suggesting that ACC gain
modulates visual uncertainty computed in visual areas to deter-
mine perceptual uncertainty and post-decision processes. Ana-
tomically, the ACC is densely interconnected with visual cortices
in rodents43,44, particularly the more rostral aspect of ACC in rat
as we have targeted here44. Furthermore, this brain region is well
positioned to integrate information about stimuli, actions, and
rewards by tracking trial-by-trial outcomes of responses45–47. In
our task, inhibition of the ACC rendered post-decision waiting
times less sensitive to the strength of visual information and
performance accuracy across trials, without affecting perceptual
discrimination itself: i.e., impaired second order but left the first
order processes intact21. Previous work in primates has demon-
strated that confidence reports are informed by both decision
difficulty and elapsed decision time (or reaction time23,28,48).
Even in the absence of a change in decision accuracy, longer
reaction times are associated with lower confidence. Here, we
demonstrate that the same effect is present in rats and is also
supported by the ACC. Finally, we found that ACC inhibition
decreased metacognitive efficiency, or the trial-by-trial corre-
spondence between decision accuracy and waiting times. In
humans, a similar effect has been reported for perturbations of
activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which is shown to be
important for visual metacognition8.
We note that our finding on gain modulation of an uncertainty
signal by ACC is not incompatible with an involvement of cin-
gulate in sensory modulation and in contributions of sensory
signals to confidence computations48,49. ACC inhibition could
reduce center-surround modulation of visual responses which, in
turn, negatively impact confidence computations. However, we
should be cautious in comparing results across different techni-
ques: microstimulation in monkeys, optogenetic activation in
mice, and DREADDs inhibition in rats. Both microstimulation
and optogenetic activation are more acute manipulations than a
chemogenetic approach used here.
We note that waiting time is an indirect measure of confidence
and as such, the effect of brain manipulations should be inter-
preted with caution. Firstly, several cortical and subcortical brain
regions participate in reward timing50–52. Secondly, an overall
reduction in waiting time can result from an increased delay
sensitivity or impulsivity and therefore may not be reflective of
confidence per se. Here, we found that inhibition of the BLA
renders rats less willing to wait overall. However, this effect of
BLA inhibition was independent of the strength of visual evidence
to make a perceptual decision. Relatedly, there is evidence that
lesions and/or pharmacological inactivation of BLA results in a
delay averse (impulsive) phenotype14 and we view the global
leftward shift in rats’ waiting times as consistent with those
findings. Furthermore, whereas inhibition of the ACC decreased
metacognitive efficiency, inhibition of the BLA failed to change
this measure. Thus, during perceptual decision-making, the BLA
may overall increase waiting time for reward, perhaps enabling
other brain regions to interpret and/or act on ACC signals related
to the strength of visual information.
Recent work documents important similarities in visual
information processing between rodents and primates, although
species differences do exist53,54. Pigmented rat strains, like the
Long–Evans strain we studied here, have previously been used for
vision research54. Here, we found that rats also show high levels
of visual metacognition, adjusting post-decision waiting times
based on the uncertainty in perceptual decisions. This may allow
direct comparison with the modality most often assessed in
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human and nonhuman primates while enabling easier, precise
circuit manipulations.
We show that stimulus–response remapping is facilitated by
perceptual certainty. Critically, both the BLA and ACC are
required for faster learning when perceptual certainty is strong
enough to improve learning. Considering that the BLA only shifts
confidence readout, the observed reversals of all benefits of con-
fidence on learning strategies and consistency in following a
stimulus–response rule after BLA inhibition suggest a direct role
of BLA in learning under uncertainty. That is, if the influence of
BLA on learning was due to shifting confidence readout we would
expect a bias in a certain direction and not reversal of all effects.
In contrast, the effects of ACC seem to work through distorting
confidence readout because its inhibition mainly attenuated the
effect of confidence on learning.
Our results are also consistent with previous observations that
the ACC–BLA circuit adjusts the levels of attention directed at
environmental cues for learning based on prediction errors45. For
example, it has been shown in rats that there is strong attention-
related activity in the ACC during the entire trial following
unexpected changes in reward which is most pronounced prior to
and during outcome-predictive cues45. In contrast, unsigned
reward prediction errors in the BLA may serve as attention sig-
nals, occurring at the time of unexpected reward delivery and
omission55. Indeed, the present data prompt a revisit of prior
findings on amygdala: post-training amygdala lesions have been
found to facilitate reversal learning56,57, result in enhanced
learning from negative feedback during reversals58, and lead to
faster instrumental extinction59 under fully predictive conditions.
Due to extensive pretraining, these effects could be driven by a
high confidence state that is slow to update without amygdala.
The ACC and BLA share direct and indirect bidirectional
projections and the activity in this circuit appears to be required
for adaptive learning under conditions of uncertainty in the visual
cues guiding decisions or perhaps under more general cases of
learning under uncertainty60–62.
Methods
Subjects. In total 31 male outbred Long–Evans rats (Charles River Laboratories,
Crl:LE, Strain code: 006) were used in the experiments. The housing room in the
vivarium was maintained under a reversed 12/12 h light/dark cycle at 22 °C and all
behavioral testing was conducted during rats’ active phase, of the dark portion of
the cycle (between 08:00 and 18:00 h). Rats remained undisturbed for 3 days after
arrival to our facility to acclimate to the vivarium. Each rat was then handled for a
minimum of 10 min once per day for 5 days. Following handling, rats underwent
stereotaxic surgery to express inhibitory DREADDs (or control null virus to
express only a fluorescent protein but no mutant receptors) and were allowed to
recover for three weeks. Rats were subsequently food-restricted to ensure moti-
vation to work for food for one week prior to and during the behavioral testing,
while water was available ad libitum except during behavioral testing. All rats were
pair-housed at arrival and separated on the last day of handling to facilitate post-
surgical recovery and minimize aggression during food restriction. We ensured that
rats did not fall below 85% of their free-feeding body weight, and we saw a sig-
nificant increase in rat body weight throughout the prolonged behavioral testing.
On the last two days of food restriction prior to behavioral training, rats were fed
20 sugar pellets in their home cage to accustom them to the food rewards. For each
experiment, rats were randomly assigned into groups, with the exception of
assignment into HC and LC conditions for reversal learning as detailed below. All
procedures were approved by the Chancellor’s Animal Research Committee at the
University of California, Los Angeles.
Viral constructs. We used inhibitory (Gi-coupled) DREADDs on a CaMKIIa
promoter to transiently inactivate projection neurons in the ACC and BLA during
performance on the behavioral task. An adeno-associated virus AAV8 driving the
hM4Di-mCherry sequence under a CaMKIIa promoter was used to express
DREADDs on putative projection neurons in the ACC or BLA (AAV8-CaMKIIa-
hM4D(Gi)-mCherry, packaged by Addgene). Furthermore, a virus lacking the
hM4Di DREADD gene and only containing the fluorescent tag EGFP (AAV8-
CaMKIIa-EGFP, packaged by Addgene) was infused into the ACC or BLA in
separate groups of animals as a null virus control.
There were four experimental groups of animals: the active DREADD virus in
BLA (n= 8), the active DREADD virus in ACC (n= 7), the null EGFP virus in
BLA (n= 8), and the null EGFP virus in ACC (n= 8). The DREADD and null
EGFP groups underwent identical surgeries and allowed us to control for
nonspecific effects of surgical procedures and exposure to AAV8.
DREADDs are inert at baseline and can be activated by administration of
Clozapine-N-oxide (CNO) to inhibit DREADD-expressing neurons. To control for
nonspecific effects of injections and handling stress, we also injected animals with
vehicle solution. To increase power and decrease the number of animals used in
experiments, we used a within-subject design for assessing the effects of CNO, with
all rats receiving CNO and vehicle injections in counterbalanced order. Inhibition
of the ACC and BLA is achieved by administration of CNO to animals with
DREADD expression in these brain regions. The other conditions (DREADD+
vehicle, EGFP+CNO and EGFP+ vehicle) served as controls for nonspecific
effects of viral infusions, CNO injections, and handling stress. We confirmed there
were no effects of virus exposure or nonspecific effects of CNO (see Supplementary
Notes 5). This allowed us to compare the DREADDs (DREADD+ CNO) effects
with the DREADD+ vehicle, which for brevity we refer to as vehicle or the control
condition in most of the paper.
Surgery. All surgeries were performed using aseptic stereotaxic techniques under
isoflurane gas anesthesia (5% in O2 during induction and 2–2.5% in O2 for
maintenance). After being placed into a stereotaxic apparatus (David Kopf; model
306041), the scalp was incised and retracted. The skull was then leveled to ensure
that bregma and lambda were in the same horizontal plane. Small burr holes were
drilled in the skull to allow cannulae with an injection needle to be lowered into the
BLA (the injection needle extended 1mm below the cannulae and its tip was at AP:
−2.5; ML: ±5.0; DV: −7.8 (0.1 μl) and −8.1 (0.2 μl) from skull surface) or ACC
(0.3 μl, AP=+3.7; ML= ±0.8; DV=−2.6). The injection needle was attached to
polyethylene tubing connected to a Hamilton syringe controlled by a syringe
pump. The viruses were infused bilaterally at a rate of 0.1 μl/min. For the BLA, the
ventral infusion was administered first (at −8.1) followed by the dorsal site (−7.8)
since our prior experiments demonstrated more precise targeting with this
approach. There was no waiting time between the two infusions for BLA. After the
last viral infusions in BLA or single infusion in ACC, the needle was left in place for
10 min to allow for diffusion of the virus, after which the cannulae were slowly
lifted out of the brain and the wounds stapled. Each surgery took approximately
40 min. All rats were given a 3-week recovery period prior to food restriction and
subsequent behavioral training. Carprofen (5 mg/kg, s.c.) was administered for
5 days postoperatively to minimize pain and discomfort. Behavioral measures of
discomfort and conditions of the wounds were monitored daily, and all surgical
staples were removed within 7–10 days after surgeries depending on a rat’s
recovery.
Electrophysiological confirmation of DREADDs. Separate rats were prepared
with ACC DREADDs using identical surgical procedures to the main experiments.
Three rats were deeply anesthetized with isoflurane and decapitated. Slice
recordings did not begin until at least three weeks following surgery to allow
sufficient hM4Di receptor expression. Slice recording methods were similar to
those previously published63. Briefly, the brain was rapidly removed and sub-
merged in ice-cold, oxygenated (95% O2/5% CO2) artificial cerebrospinal fluid
(ACSF) containing (in mM) as follows: 124 NaCl, 4 KCl, 25 NaHCO3, 1 NaH2PO4,
2 CaCl2, 1.2 MgSO4, and 10 glucose (Sigma-Aldrich). 400-μm-thick slices con-
taining the ACC were then cut using a Campden 7000SMZ-2 vibratome. Slices
from the site of viral infusion were used for inhibitory Gi validation. Expression of
mCherry was confirmed post hoc. Slices were maintained (at 30 °C) in interface-
type chambers that were continuously perfused (2–3 ml/min) with ACSF and
allowed to recover for at least 2 h before recordings. Following recovery, slices were
perfused in a submerged slice recording chamber (2–3 ml/min) with ACSF con-
taining 100 μM picrotoxin to block GABAA receptor-mediated inhibitory synaptic
currents. A glass microelectrode filled with ACSF (resistance= 5–10MΩ) was
placed in layer 2/3 ACC to record field excitatory postsynaptic synaptic potentials
and population spikes elicited by layer 1 stimulation delivered using a bipolar,
nichrome-wire stimulating electrode placed near the medial wall in ACC. Stimu-
lation intensity (0.2 ms duration pulses delivered at 0.33 Hz) was set to the mini-
mum level required to induce reliable population spiking in ACC. Once reliable
responses (measured as the area of postsynaptic responses over a 4-s interval) were
detected, baseline measures were taken for at least 10 min, followed by a 20 min
bath application of 10 μM CNO. Unless noted otherwise, all chemicals were
obtained from Sigma-Aldrich.
Behavioral training. Behavioral training was conducted in operant conditioning
chambers (Model 80604, Lafayette Instrument Co., Lafayette, IN) that were housed
within the sound- and light-attenuating cubicles. Each chamber was equipped with
a house light, tone generator, video camera, and LCD touchscreen opposing the
pellet dispenser. The pellet dispenser delivered 45-mg dustless precision sucrose
pellets. Software (ABET II TOUCH; Lafayette Instrument Co., Model 89505)
controlled the hardware. During habituation, rats were required to eat five pellets
out of the pellet tray inside of the chambers within 15 min before exposure to any
stimuli on the touchscreen. They were then progressively trained to respond to
visual stimuli presented on the screen, to initiate the trial, report the orientation of
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the visual stimulus (vertical or horizontal) by nosepoking left or right on a white
square stimulus, and wait for rewards.
Behavioral testing and experimental paradigm. A rat first initiated each trial by
nosepoking a bright white square in the center of the screen. The initiation sti-
mulus then disappeared, and a rat was briefly (1 s) presented with a vertical (V) or
horizontal (H) Gabor patch embedded in noise, and required to report the
orientation (H or V) based on a complementary stimulus–response rule, e.g., H→
left and V→ right. These spatial responses were made by nosepoking the right or
left compartments of the touchscreen that became illuminated after the dis-
appearance of the oriented visual stimulus. We altered two properties of the visual
stimuli to manipulate their ambiguity. First, we changed the SNR, defined as the
ratio of the contrast of the Gabor patch relative to the contrast of the added
Gaussian noise. Second, we changed the overall contrast of both the Gabor
patch and the added noise for a given SNR. Gratings were 200 pixels square,
with spatial frequency 20 px/cycle. For training, gratings were presented at 100%
contrast. For testing, gratings were embedded in white noise as follows. To create
different contrasts designed to produce a range of performance (measured by d′)
and confidence (measured by waiting time) responses such that HC and LC
conditions could be established, animals performed the task on 40, 60, and 80%
maximum contrast Gabor patches embedded in noise also with three possible levels
of increasing contrast, for nine possible full-factorial combinations in total. This
method of constant stimuli64 facilitated selection of a pair of stimuli from these
nine levels such that the animal had produced matched perceptual performance
capacity (d′) but different waiting time in HC and LC conditions.
Correct choices were reinforced probabilistically after a randomly assigned
delay: 70% of correct responses resulted in reward delivery. Time to reward
delivery was drawn from an exponential distribution with mean of 8 s and on trials
with no reward, the trial ended after 40 s if no reinitiation occured. Specifically,
following stimulus discrimination, rats expressed their confidence by time
wagering: they could wait a self-timed delay in anticipation of reward or initiate a
new trial similar to previous work by the Kepecs lab11. The initiation stimulus
appeared on the touchscreen 2 s after a rat indicated its choice. This delay was
imposed to prevent nondiscriminant responding. We define the time that the
animal waited before reinitiating a trial as the waiting time (see Supplementary
Fig. 7 for an example and the average the distributions of waiting time).
Following fully learning the task and testing on the perceptual decision-making
with re-initiation (confidence report), rats were randomly assigned to a HC- or LC
condition and experienced a reversal in the stimulus–response rule. In order to
determine the visual stimuli for HC and LC conditions for each rat, we selected two
SNR and contrast levels that had equal discrimination accuracy (d′) and
reinforcement history and were different only in confidence levels measured by
waiting time. After determining discrimination-matched stimuli for each rat, rats
were randomly assigned to LC and HC conditions and the corresponding stimulus
was used for each rat based on the assigned condition. After the reversal in
stimulus–response rule, rats were no longer offered an option to reinitiate the trial,
but were required to wait a random delay before reward delivery or the end of the
trial (on no-reward trials) following a response. This was to simplify the re-learning
and ensure rats were not adopting a complex strategy due to the availability of the
reinitiation option.
To study the contributions of BLA and ACC to decision-making and learning
under perceptual uncertainty, we used a within-subject design: rats were given
vehicle injections, CNO injections, and no injection (prior to reversal). The order
of CNO and vehicle injections was counterbalanced. Therefore, a subset of
behavioral sessions were preceded by inactivation of ACC or BLA pyramidal
neurons via peripheral (3 mg/kg; i.p.) administration of CNO 10min prior to the
testing. The injections were administered in rats’ housing room. Due to the long
duration of pretraining on our task, all CNO injections were administered at least
12 weeks following the surgery, ensuring sufficient virus transduction and receptor
expression. On another subset of sessions, rats received vehicle to control for
behavioral effects of the stress of injections. All rats received 2-day wash-out period
between drug conditions and the order of injections was counterbalanced
across rats.
Histology. Rats were euthanized within 90 min following the last testing session
with an overdose of Euthasol (Euthasol, 0.8 mL, 390 mg/mL pentobarbital, 50 mg/
mL phenytoin; Virbac, Fort Worth, TX), were transcardially perfused, and their
brains removed for histological processing. Brains were fixed in 10% buffered
formalin acetate for 24 h followed by 30% sucrose for 5 days. To visualize hM4Di-
mCherry and EGFP expression in BLA or ACC cell bodies, free-floating 40-μm
coronal sections were mounted onto slides and coverslipped with mounting
medium for DAPI. Slices were visualized using a BZ-X710 microscope (Keyence,
Itasca, IL), and analyzed with BZ-X Viewer and analysis software.
Signal detection theory analyses. According to standard signal detection theory,
d′ measures how well a subject’s perceptual decisions track physical stimuli. d′ is
preferred to other discrimination accuracy measures (i.e., percent or probability
correct) because it accounts for biases such as side bias, stimulus preference19.
Extending the same approach to confidence measures, metacognitive sensitivity
measures how well confidence tracks the likelihood that a perceptual decision is
correct, and like d′, can also be formulated to account for bias. Specifically,
Maniscalco and Lau have proposed meta—d′ to measure metacognitive sensitivity
on the same scale as d′ so that one can calculate the ratio between the two (meta—d
′/d′) to assess the metacognitive efficiency of a subject31. They defined the task of
classifying stimuli as a Type 1 task, whereas the rating of confidence in this clas-
sification as a Type 2 task. Meta—d′/d′ varies between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates
that the rat’s trial-by-trial waiting times (i.e., confidence) do not correspond with
trial accuracy and 1 indicates that the rat’s Type 2 capacity is exactly matching its
Type 1 sensitivity. In other words, subjects could wait a longer time before reini-
tiating a trial when their response is correct, and wait less time before re-initiating
when the response is incorrect, considering the limitation in discrimination.
Compared to commonly used Type 2 receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
analysis, the meta—d′/d′ approach has the advantage of allowing one to isolate the
effects of confidence on behavior from basic perceptual performance capacity. To
calculate meta—d′, we used MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA) functions freely
available at http://www.columbia.edu/~bsm2105/type2sdt/.
Data analyses. We used MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA; Version R2018b)
for data and statistical analyses. For trial-by-trial learning analyses, we included
data from all 15 rats that completed a total of 127,303 trials in 603 sessions.
Learning occurred in a mixed design with three within-subject/repeated-measures
of stage (vehicle, inhibition, no-injection) and three between-subjects- (group)
conditions of vehicle, ACC inhibition, and BLA inhibition. All 15 rats experienced
the vehicle and no-injection conditions. However, 8 and 7 rats experienced BLA
and ACC inhibition conditions, respectively. Since it was possible that a rat
received reward prior to intended re-initiation of a trial, we excluded rewarded
trials in the analysis of waiting time and reaction time. Furthermore, we excluded
the trials in which reaction time deviated from the mean of the reaction time of the
session by more than three times the standard deviation. This exclusion criterion
was observed because there were trials in which the rat starts moving around and
ignores the stimulus. This criterion resulted in removal of 1.1% of the trials.
Unlike the analyses presented in the preceding sections with n= 7 or 8 for each
targeted brain region, statistical results for after reversal were restricted to 3 or 4
rats per group due to the additional HC and LC conditions (n= 4 rats in each of
the HC and LC conditions with the BLA as the targeted region, n= 4 rats in the
HC condition and n= 3 rats in the LC condition with the ACC as the targeted
region). This constraint was a consequence of the experimental (within-subject)
design and longitudinal nature of pretraining on the task, followed by extensive
learning. Not including pretraining, the mean number of sessions to complete both
the initial and relearning part of the experiments was 40–210 trials on average, in
each session.
For comparisons of learning strategies and consistency following in following a
stimulus–response rule across different experimental conditions, we used
permutation tests. More specifically, we first calculated the actual probability of
using a strategy (e.g., Win–Stay) in the observed data and then permuted this data
10,000 times to construct the permutation or null distribution. We then calculated
the probability of obtaining the observed value for use of the strategy based on the
null distribution from which we estimated p values65. We used Bonferroni
correction on p values.
To compare the rate of learning after reversal we used an exponential function
to fit the learning curve from all rats in a given experimental condition
PðCÞ ¼ 1
1 expðtrial=αÞ ; ð1Þ
where α is the learning parameter.
Finally, we showed the only significant difference between the HC and LC
conditions prior to reversal learning was waiting time for the assigned contrast-
SNR pairs that were administered after reversals. Since contrast is correlated with
SNR, we used a stepwise regression to find the variables which contributed
significantly in explaining the response variables (waiting time, reward history).
Confidence condition was entered as a predictor variable in a GLM along with
other variables (SNR, contrast, targeted brain region, and trial accuracy) in a
stepwise manner to observe which of these increased adjusted R-squared
significantly for the response variables.
Rule-based repetition index (RRI). In order to examine the consistency in fol-
lowing a stimulus–response rule on two consecutive trials, we used a repetition
index that was previously introduced to capture tendency to repeat the same choice
beyond what is expected by chance34, and extended it to selection based on
response rules. Specifically, we computed the probability that the same rule (either
correct or incorrect) was used on two consecutive trials, p(StayRule), and sub-
tracted the tendency to repeat the same rule on two consecutive trials due solely to
chance to arrive at the rule-based repetition index
RRI ¼ pðStayRuleÞ  pðCÞ  pðCÞ  ð1 pðCÞÞ  ð1 pðCÞÞ; ð2Þ
where p(C) is the probability of choosing the correct rule. Therefore, unlike other
perseveration indices66, the RRI accounts for the probability of using the same rule
on consecutive trials by chance.
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Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in
the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
All data generated and/or analyzed during this study are available in the following
repository: https://gin.g-node.org/aizquie/Izquierdo_Lab_UCLA.
Code availability
All customized behavioral task codes can be found on https://github.com/izquierdolab/
perceptual-uncertainty.
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